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In Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co.,1 the Supreme Court acknowledged
and refused to curb the increasing2 use of the powerful civil action provi-
sion' of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act4 (RICO
or the Act) by commercial plaintiffs in ordinary business fraud cases.5
The Court's interpretation of RICO may have a potentially disastrous
side effect, however, because its application will allow the ever-expanding
class that claims fraud in the procurement of a patente to assert a RICO
treble damages claim as well.7 By altering the carefully balanced set of
incentives the patent law creates for inventors, RICO will discourage both
invention and patenting. RICO and the law of patent fraud must be con-
strued to avoid these consequences. The regulatory scheme in the patent
laws should remain the basic method of patent oversight and control, and
only persons who violate the terms of the patent "contract"' through will-
ful and highly material fraud should be liable under RICO. Presently,
such people may also be liable under the antitrust laws for their frauds.
1. 105 S. Ct. 3275 (1985), decided along with American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago v.
Haroco, Inc., 105 S. Ct. 3291 (1985) (per curiam).
2. The Court noted the large increase in the number of cases adjudicated under the civil action
provision, 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1982). Sedima, 105 S. Ct. at 3277 n.1.
3. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1982). Section 1964(c) provides for treble damages, attorney's fees, and
costs. Id.
4. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1982 & Supp. III 1985). RICO formed Title IX of the Organized
Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922, 941-48.
5. The Court reversed the holding of the Second Circuit, 741 F.2d 482 (2d Cir. 1984), which had
tried to limit RICO's growth in the area of business fraud. See also Alexander Grant & Co. v.
Tiffany Indus., 742 F.2d 408 (8th Cir. 1984) (limiting RICO but distinguishing its method from that
of Second Circuit's Sedima opinion), vacated and remanded, 105 S. Ct. 3550 (1985). The Sedima
dissenters also wished to limit RICO. See infra note 115 and accompanying text.
6. See infra note 49.
7. If the fraud is advanced by use of the mails, the patent applicant may have committed mail
fraud. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1982); see infra Section II.D. Mail fraud is a RICO predicate act. See infra
notes 17-22 and accompanying text.
8. See, e.g., Grant v. Raymond, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 218, 241-42 (1832) (describing character of
contract); see also Comment, Inequitable Conduct and the Duty of Disclosure in Patent Procure-
ment, 1986 B.Y.U. L. REv. 149, 149 (same).
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I. THE BROAD REACH OF CIVIL RICO
A. The RICO Act
Congress enacted RICO in 19709 to provide a remedy against the or-
ganization of criminal elements into economic entities of unfair power. 0
Fearing that sophisticated leaders of organized crime ventures would cir-
cumvent any narrowly drawn statute, Congress framed RICO very
broadly and included a highly unusual provision mandating that RICO
"be liberally construed to effectuate its remedial purposes."1" The bill that
became RICO was originally drafted as a criminal statute,1 2 but Congress
added a private right of action for civil enforcement against RICO viola-
tors analogous to one in antitrust law." Motivated by the availability of
treble damages for all injuries to their business or property caused by a
violation of the Act,1 4 costs, and a reasonable attorney's fee,1 5 civil plain-
tiffs have imaginatively and aggressively invoked RICO in many unex-
pected areas.1
9. See supra note 4.
10. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 105 S. Ct. 3275, 3299-301 (1985) (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(reviewing history of RICO enactment). The statute's purpose is implicit in its title, id. at 3288
(Powell, J., dissenting), as well as the legislative history. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 1549, 91st Cong.,
2d Sess. 185, reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4007, 4081 (dissenting views of
Reps. Conyers, Mikva, and Ryan) (RICO "seeks to stymie organized crime's growing infiltration of
legitimate business"); S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 35-46 (1969) (discussing organized
crime problem in United States); id. at 76 (purpose of Title IX is "elimination of the infiltration of
organized crime and racketeering into legitimate organizations operating in interstate commerce"); id.
at 80 (Title IX will remove organized crime from its sources of economic power); see also United
States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 589 (1981) ("purpose of Congress 'to seek the eradication of organ-
ized crime in the United States'" (quoting statement of findings prefacing Organized Crime Control
Act of 1970, 84 Stat. 922, 923 (1970), reprinted in 18 U.S.C. § 1961 app. at 362 (1982)).
11. Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 904(a), 84 Stat. 922, 947,
reprinted in 18 U.S.C. § 1961 app. at 362 (1982); see Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 27
(1983) (RICO is "only substantive federal criminal statute that contains such a directive").
12. See Sedima, 105 S. Ct. at 3280-81, and sources cited therein.
13. Id.; id. at 3282 & n.8. But see the cautionary note in id. at 3297-99 (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(explaining dangers of inferring too much from analogy). Cf Clayton Act § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1982)
(civil action provision of antitrust laws).
14. Section 1962 is the heart of RICO. Subsection (a) makes it a crime for a person to use or
invest income derived from a pattern of racketeering activity to acquire an interest in, establish, or
operate any "enterprise" that is engaged in or affects interstate or foreign commerce. 18 U.S.C. §
1962(a) (1982). An "'enterprise' includes any individual, partnership, corporation, association, or
other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal en-
tity." 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (1982). Subsection 1962(b) makes it a crime "for any person through a
pattern of racketeering activity . . . to acquire or maintain . . . any interest in or control of any
enterprise which is engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce." 18
U.S.C. § 1962(b) (1982). The next subsection declares it to be "unlawful for any person employed by
or associated with any enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign
commerce, to conduct or participate. . . in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs through a pattern
of racketeering activity . . . ." 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (1982). Finally, it is illegal to conspire to do any
of the above. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) (1982).
15. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1982).
16. See, e.g., cases collected infra note 89; Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n v. Touche Ross
& Co., 782 F.2d 966 (11th Cir. 1986) (bank audit error); Furman v. Cirrito, 741 F.2d 524 (2d Cir.
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RICO plaintiffs must allege that the defendant conducted an enterprise
through a "pattern of racketeering activity,"1 7 defined to require at least
two of a listed set of chargeable or indictable "predicate" acts committed
within ten years of each other.1" These predicate acts include mail and
wire fraud,19 and extortion or interference with commerce.2 0 The fraud
offenses, sources of much of RICO's growth, prohibit criminally fraudu-
lent schemes that involve use of the mails or wires,2 1 and each such use is
a separately indictable act. 22 Hence two mailings can turn simple liability
for the tort of fraud into potentially crippling exposure to treble damages.
1984), vacated and remanded sub nom. Joel v. Cirrito, 105 S. Ct. 3550 (1985) (partnership
dissolution).
17. 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (1982).
18. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (1982) provides:
(5) "pattern of racketeering activity" requires at least two acts of racketeering activity, one of
which occurred after the effective date of this chapter and the last of which occurred within ten
years (excluding any period of imprisonment) after the commission of a prior act of racketeer-
ing activity.
"Racketeering activity" is defined at 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (Supp. 1111985) by expressly listing a large
set of state and federal criminal activities.
19. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1982) provides in pertinent part:
Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to defraud, or for ob-
taining money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or
promises ...for the purpose of executing such scheme or artifice or attempting so to do,
places in any post office or authorized depository for mail matter, any matter or thing
whatever to be sent or delivered by the Postal Service, or takes or receives therefrom, any such
matter or thing, or knowingly causes to be delivered by mail according to the direction thereon,
or at the place at which it is directed to be delivered by the person to whom it is addressed, any
such matter or thing, shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than five
years, or both.
18 U.S.C. § 1343 (1982) provides:
Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to defraud, or for ob-
taining money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or
promises, transmits or causes to be transmitted by means of wire, radio, or television communi-
cation in interstate or foreign commerce, any writings, signs, signals, pictures, or sounds for the
purpose of executing such scheme or artifice, shall be fined not more than $1,000 or impris-
oned not more than five years, or both.
The two statutes are to be construed in part materia. United States v. Lemire, 720 F.2d 1327, 1334
n.6 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1226 (1984); United States v. Giovengo, 637 F.2d 941,
944 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1032 (1981). Henceforth this Note will use "mails" to
refer to both the mails and the wires, and § 1341 to refer to both § 1341 and § 1343.
20. 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (1982) provides in relevant part:
(a) Whoever in any way or degree obstructs, delays, or affects commerce or the movement of
any article or commodity in commerce, by robbery or extortion or attempts or conspires so to
do, or commits or threatens physical violence to any person or property in furtherance of a
plan or purpose to do anything in violation of this section shall be fined not more than $10,000
or imprisoned not more than twenty years, or both.
(b) As used in this section...
(2) The term "extortion" means the obtaining of property from another, with
his consent, induced by wrongful use of actual or threatened force, violence, or
fear, or under color of official right.
This Note will not examine the specific impact of a RICO claim based on § 1951 on the patent law
though many of the same policy considerations apply. For the mechanics of such a claim, see Adamo
& Ducatman, Civil RICO-Are Patents Next?, 66 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 185, 231-32 (1984).
21. See infra Section I.B. (analyzing mail fraud statute).
22. "'[T]here is no doubt that the law may make each putting of a letter into the post office a
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The courts have confirmed the broad reach of RICO. For example, the
enterprise associated with the racketeering activity may be either "legiti-
mate" or "illegitimate. '23 In Sedima, the Court held that a civil plaintiff
could initiate an action against a defendant who had never been convicted
either of RICO or of predicate criminal violations,2 nor need a plaintiff
allege a separate "racketeering" injury beyond the harms caused by the
predicate acts.25 The Court felt compelled to interpret broadly the statute
because of its language and part of its accompanying legislative history,
even though this construction implicitly sanctions suits in areas never con-
templated by Congress.2"
B. Common Law Fraud and the Federal Mail and Wire Fraud
Statutes
The growth of civil RICO derives in large measure from the inclusion
of mail fraud within the definition of racketeering activity.27 The scope of
criminal liability for mail fraud has grown startlingly, and the crime is
now far removed from the original concept of actionable fraud.2" Even so,
common law fraud rules provide a useful basis for comparison that aids
understanding regarding the reach of the statute.
separate offence.' " United States v. Joyce, 499 F.2d 9, 18 (7th Cir.) (quoting Badders v. United
States, 240 U.S. 391, 394 (1916)), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1031 (1974).
According to a former Chief of Business Frauds Prosecutions for the United States Attorney for the
Southern District of New York, the legal fiction that the act of mailing is the core of the crime of mail
fraud has several unusual consequences, including the fact that
it results in each separate use of the mails constituting a separate crime. Consequently, the
number of counts of mail fraud with which a defendant may be charged turns not on the scope
or duration of the fraud, the number of victims, the amount of damage, or any other factor
relating to the moral culpability of the perpetrator or the social damage inflicted by his fraud,
but rather depends on the sheer happenstance of how many times the mails have been used in
executing the fraud.
Rakoff, The Federal Mail Fraud Statute (Part I), 18 DUQ. L. REV. 771, 778 (1980) (footnote
omitted).
23. United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576 (1981).
24. 105 S. Ct. 3275, 3284 (1985).
25. Id. at 3285.
26. Id. at 3286-87. For the announced purpose of Congress, see supra note 10 and accompanying
text.
27. A 1985 study found that of the 270 civil RICO cases known at that time, 77% principally
involved claims of fraud. REPORT OF THE AD HOC CIVIL RICO TASK FORCE OF THE ABA SECTION
OF CORPORATION, BANKING AND BusINEss LAW 55-56 (1985), cited in Sedima, 105 S. Ct. at 3287
n.16; see also Oversight on Civil RICO Suits: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
99th Cong., 1st Sess. 126-27 (1985) [hereinafter 1985 Hearings] (statement of Stephen S. Trott,
Ass't Att'y Gen.) (citing Justice Department statistics). But see id. at 423-25 (statement of Nat'l
Ass'n of Att'ys Gen. and Nat'l Dist. Att'ys Ass'n) (challenging ABA Report figures).
28. It is difficult to ascertain whether Congress intended that any "scheme or artifice to defraud"
prohibited by the statute, see supra note 19, also create liability as a common law tort, because neither
the original enactment nor any subsequent revision had any useful legislative history. See Morano,
The Mail-Fraud Statute: A Procrustean Bed, 14 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 45, 45-47 & n.2 (1980).
The courts have never held that the statute only prohibits conduct that would create liability in tort.
See infra note 30 and accompanying text.
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Proof of common law fraud required (1) an affirmative misrepresenta-
tion (2) of a material fact (3) made with knowledge of its falsity (4) and
with intent to deceive (5) upon which another relied (6) to her actual
injury.2" The federal courts have required less for mail fraud3 0 and have
simplified and otherwise reduced the elements of the crime. The two prin-
cipal elements are a scheme to defraud and a use of the mails.3" The
scheme may consist of omissions of material facts or otherwise deceptive
patterns of conduct as well as affirmative misrepresentations.3 2 Courts do
not require proof that anyone is actually taken in by the deception3" or
that the scheme otherwise succeeds in any way.3 4 Hence reliance and in-
jury are not elements of the federal offense. Although most circuits require
a scheme reasonably calculated to defraud persons of " 'ordinary prudence
and comprehension,' ".,5 some courts have held that a violation occurs even
if only the most gullible people will be deceived."
Courts also differ on the requisite level of intent. Although a specific
intent to defraud is always necessary," some courts have held that this
intent may be demonstrated by a "reckless disregard" of the facts,3  while
others hold that "knowledge"39 is required. Misrepresentations that form
29. See PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 727-29 (W. Keeton 5th ed. 1984); 37
C.J.S. Fraud § 3 (1943); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 525-549 (1977); see also American
Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, Inc., 725 F.2d 1350, 1363-64 (Fed. Cir.) (distinguishing
common law fraud from patent fraud), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 821 (1984).
On the problems of proof in fraud cases, see A. LEFF, SWINDLING AND SELLING 181-83 (1976).
30. See Rakoff, supra note 22, at 799 & nn. 117-18; see also Durland v. United States, 161 U.S.
306 (1896) (rejecting defense based on necessary elements of common law tort of false pretenses).
31. Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1954) (elements of mail fraud are scheme to de-
fraud and mailing of letter to execute scheme); United States v. Haimowitz, 725 F.2d 1561, 1568-69
(11th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1072 (1984).
32. United States v. O'Malley, 707 F.2d 1240, 1247 (11th Cir. 1983); United States v. Bohonus,
628 F.2d 1167, 1172 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 928 (1980).
33. United States v. Rasheed, 663 F.2d 843, 850 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1157
(1982); United States v. Buchanan, 633 F.2d 423, 427 (5th Cir. Unit A 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S.
912 (1981).
34. United States v. Lemm, 680 F.2d 1193, 1205 (8th Cir. 1982) (success of scheme not element
of § 1341 offense), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1110 (1983); United States v. Reicin, 497 F.2d 563, 571
(7th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 996 (1974).
35. United States v. Bohonus, 628 F.2d 1167, 1172 (9th Cir.) (quoting Irwin v. United States,
338 F.2d 770, 773 (9th Cir. f964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 911 (1965)), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 928
(1980).
36. United States v. Brien, 617 F.2d 299, 311 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 919 (1980);
Lemon v. United States, 278 F.2d 369, 373 (9th Cir. 1960).
37. United States v. Williams, 728 F.2d 1402, 1404 (11th Cir. 1984); United States v. Gelb, 700
F.2d 875, 879 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 853 (1983). Although there must be a specific intent
to defraud, there need not be a specific intent to use the mails. United States v. Cusino, 694 F.2d 185,
188 (9th Cir. 1982) (§ 1343 case), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 932 (1983).
38. United States v. Schaflander, 719 F.2d 1024, 1027 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S.
1216 (1984); United States v. Boyer, 694 F.2d 58, 59 (3d Cir. 1982).
39. United States v. Kreimer, 609 F.2d 126, 128 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v. Precision Med-
ical Laboratories, Inc., 593 F.2d 434, 443 (2d Cir. 1978); see also Windsor v. United States, 384 F.2d
535, 536-37 (9th Cir. 1967) (actual, rather than constructive, knowledge required); United States v.
Interstate Eng'g Corp., 288 F. Supp. 402, 412 (D.N.H. 1967) (judge instructing jury that civil agency
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the basis of mail fraud claims must be material,40 but one court has de-
fined materiality as "hav[ing] a natural tendency to influence or . . .ca-
pable of influencing another's decision." '41 In sum, judicial interpretation
of the mail fraud statute has significantly expanded the class of activities
prohibited by the rules of common law fraud.42
Furthermore, at least until the Sedima decision, 43 any two mailings,
even of duplicate material, arising out of the same fraudulent scheme sat-
isfied the "pattern" requirement of a RICO charge,44 though at least one
court disapproved of this multiplication of counts to achieve extra indict-
ments.45 Thus, a mail fraud-based RICO claim could be quite simple. It
could consist of: (1) The defendant recklessly failed to state a fact which
might have deceived someone; (2) in furtherance of this deception, the de-
fendant sent two mailings; and (3) this fraud injured plaintiff's business
or property. This simple allegation can result in treble damages for the
plaintiff.46
II. RICO's THREAT TO PATENT HOLDERS
In order to understand how the disclosure requirements of the patent
laws might give rise to a mail fraud-based RICO claim, it is necessary to
understand the nature of these requirements and their relationship to the
law of fraud. Contemporary rules regarding incomplete or false disclo-
sures before the Patent & Trademark Office (PTO), known as inequitable
principles cannot be used to impute knowledge in mail fraud prosecution).
40. United States v. Halbert, 640 F.2d 1000, 1008 (9th Cir. 1981).
41. United States v. Halbert, 712 F.2d 388, 390 (9th Cir. 1983) (quoting instructions of trial
judge), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1005 (1984); cf. TSC Indus. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438 (1976)
(defining "material" in securities fraud context); United States v. Chandler, 752 F.2d 1148, 1151 (6th
Cir. 1985) (same for false statement statute).
42. See Hurson, Limiting the Federal Mail Fraud Statute-A Legislative Approach, 20 AM.
CRm. L. REv. 423, 424 (1983) (in recent years statute "has been expansively interpreted to invite
federal prosecution of virtually every type of untoward activity known to man"); Rakoff, supra note
22, at 772 (characterizing mail fraud statute as "the sole instrument of justice that could be wielded
against the ever-innovative practitioners of deceit").
43. For the position of the courts since Sedima, see infra notes 117-21 and accompanying text.
44. United States v. Weatherspoon, 581 F.2d 595, 602 (7th Cif. 1978); United States v. Zang,
703 F.2d 1186, 1194 (10th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 828 (1983). In Weatherspoon the
defendant argued that all the predicate mailings were in furtherance of the same scheme to defraud
and therefore constituted only one act of racketeering activity. 581 F.2d at 601. The Seventh Circuit
disagreed and noted that several courts have held that the "pattern" must consist of "acts [that are]
connected by a common scheme, plan or motive." Id. at 601-02 & n.2. This holding is in accordance
with the modern trend in federal mail fraud law which locates the crime in the mailing (a necessary
jurisdictional component) and not in the scheme to defraud. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
However, even the Seventh Circuit will no longer let the breadth of mail fraud law create inappropri-
ate RICO charges. See infra note 121.
45. United States v. Joyce, 499 F.2d 9, 23 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1031 (1974); 499
F.2d at 25 (Swygert, C.J., dissenting in part).
For the change in approach since Sedima, see infra notes 117-21 and accompanying text.
46. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1982).
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conduct, developed from both principles of equity and the relaxation of
common law fraud rules.47 It is this second strand that potential RICO
claimants seek to exploit.
A. Patent Law Duty To Reveal Prior Art
During the last fifteen years, defendants to patent infringement suits
have increasingly contested the enforceability of the patent in suit by al-
leging "inequitable conduct," or, if the conduct is more egregious, con-
testing validity 8 by alleging "fraud on the PTO."4 These equitable
defenses derive from the duty of the patent applicant to provide to the
PTO, with the highest degree of candor, 50 all known material informa-
tion on such items as previous related patents, similar inventions, and
related documents so that the PTO may properly evaluate the strength
of the pending application.5' Such information is known as "prior
47. See Digital Equip. Corp. v. Diamond, 653 F.2d 701, 708 (1st Cir. 1981) ("The concept of
'fraud on the Patent Office,' as something distinct from common law fraud or deceit, derives primarily
from judicial opinions in infringement actions, holding patents 'unenforceable' on equitable
grounds.").
48. For a discussion of the criteria that can be used to distinguish levels of conduct and of the
distinctions between invalidity and unenforceability, see infra Section II.C.
49. "'Fraud in the PTO' has been over-played, is appearing in nearly every patent suit, and is
cluttering up the patent system." Kimberly-Clark Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson, 745 F.2d 1437, 1454
(Fed. Cir. 1984); see also Preemption Devices, Inc. v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 732 F.2d 903,
908 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (fraud a "much-abused and too often last-resort allegation"); Comment, supra
note 8, at 151 (noting popularity of defense).
Throughout this Note, fraud and inequitable conduct will be considered defenses to actions by
patentees for infringement. However, these issues can be, and often are, raised by private parties
challenging either the validity or enforceability of a patent ("non-patentees") via a declaratory judg-
ment action or suit for refund of royalty payments. The United States can also raise these issues in an
action to revoke a patent, although such actions have been rare in the past 25 years. See, e.g., United
States v. American Bell Tel. Co., 128 U.S. 315 (1888) (involving original Bell telephone patents);
United States v. Standard Elec. Time Co., 155 F. Supp. 949 (D. Mass. 1957). This Note will not
consider suits by the United States and will encompass both offensive and defensive charges when
using the term inequitable conduct "defenses."
50. KangaROOS U.S.A., Inc. v. Caldor, Inc., 585 F. Supp. 1516, 1522 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (quoting
Kingsland v. Dorsey, 338 U.S. 318, 319 (1949) (per curiam) (attorney barred from Patent Office
practice for lack of candor)), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 778 F.2d 1571 (Fed. Cir.
1985).
51. The nature of the equitable defenses is also a result of their long and complex history. An
introduction to this history will illuminate more completely the basis for the present structure. In the
first modern case of patent fraud, Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Automotive Maintenance Mach.
Co., 324 U.S. 806 (1945), the defendant in a patent infringement and contract action raised the
equitable defense of "unclean hands." Id. at 807-08. The defendant did not ask to cancel or annul the
patent, which, at that time, only the government could do. Mowry v. Whitney, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.)
434 (1872). The defendant in Precision Instrument asserted only that unclean hands prevented en-
forcement of a patent in a court of equity, and the Supreme Court agreed. It held that equity "does
require that [patent holders] shall have acted fairly and without fraud or deceit as to the controversy
in issue," 324 U.S. at 814-15, but that
one's misconduct need not necessarily have been of such a nature as to be punishable as a
crime or as to justify legal proceedings of any character. Any willful act concerning the cause
of action which rightfully can be said to transgress equitable standards of conduct is sufficient
cause for the invocation of the maxim by the chancellor.
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art."5' 2 Courts imposed the duty of disclosure on applicants to redress the
imbalance resulting from the ex parte nature of the patent application
process, 53 where
[b]ecause of limitations on the time and facilities available to the
PTO to search for prior art relevant to pending applications for pat-
ent, or to conduct tests to check assertions of efficacy or superiority,
the PTO must rely heavily on the representations of patent
applicants.54
Furthermore, the courts reasoned, an applicant may perform this duty
with little extra effort because she must provide only information actually
known to her. 5 The PTO has expanded this duty with regulations on the
Id. at 815 (emphasis added). Even so, in agreeing with the defendant, the Court characterized the
plaintiff's conduct as "perjury." Id. at 816. The Court also explained why inequitable conduct could
affect a patent holder's rights: "The far-reaching social and economic consequences of a patent...
give the public a paramount interest in seeing that patent monopolies spring from backgrounds free
from fraud or other inequitable conduct and that such monopolies are kept within their legitimate
scope." Id.
Twenty years later the Court examined the effect of "intentional fraud" during the patent applica-
tion process and held that such conduct may expose a patent holder to antitrust liability as long as the
relevant market allegations are proven. Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp.,
382 U.S. 172, 176 (1965). The Court restricted its holding to such grievous conduct, see id. at 179-80
(Harlan, J., concurring) ("knowing and willful fraud"), and held that "good faith," including an
"honest mistake," was a complete defense. Id. at 177; see also E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v.
Berkley & Co., 620 F.2d 1247, 1273 (8th Cir. 1980) ("attempt to base ... antitrust counterclaim on
'inequitable conduct' has no basis in law").
The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (CCPA), one predecessor court of the Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit (CAFC), comprehensively examined the state of patent fraud law in 1970.
Norton v. Curtiss, 433 F.2d 779 (C.C.P.A. 1970). Unfortunately, it had no clear analytical frame-
work and intermingled concepts of fraud with concepts of the less exacting "unclean hands" doctrine.
See id. at 793. Nevertheless, its holdings have been very influential, in part because all patent appeals
are now adjudicated in the CAFC, which derives its precedent from the CCPA. South Corp. v. United
States, 690 F.2d 1368, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 1982). The CCPA noted that, traditionally, fraud sufficient to
cause cancellation of a patent must approximate common law fraud. Norton, 433 F.2d at 792. How-
ever, the CCPA agreed with other courts that sufficiently "reprehensible" conduct, even though lack-
ing one or more elements the common law would consider necessary to classify the activity as fraudu-
lent, could result in patent unenforceability. Id. at 793; cf infra note 60 (present view on relationship
between common law and patent fraud). In doing so, the court liberalized the concept of fraud to
encompass the equitable notions of the "unclean hands" doctrine.
Recently, the CAFC has abandoned the term "fraud" and now considers all such claims under the
"inequitable conduct" rubric. See infra note 75 and accompanying text.
See generally Miller, Fraud on the PTO, 58 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 271 (1976); Comment, supra
note 8.
52. See 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1982 & Supp. III 1985) (obviousness defined with respect to "prior
art"); see also infra note 57 (citing sources for prior art definitions).
53. KangaROOS U.S.A., Inc. v. Caldor, Inc., 585 F. Supp. 1516, 1522 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (quoting
Norton v. Curtiss, 433 F.2d 779, 793-94 (C.C.P.A. 1970)), vacated and remanded on other
grounds, 778 F.2d 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
54. KangaROOS, 585 F. Supp. at 1522.
55. American Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, Inc., 725 F.2d 1350, 1362 (Fed. Cir.) (appli-
cant has no duty to search and no obligation to present PTO with information of which she "reasona-
bly should be aware"), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 821 (1984).
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"duty of disclosure. "56
However, even an applicant acting in good faith may be reluctant to
provide material which she believes is either irrelevant or not prior art as
the law defines that term,57 because an examiner may misinterpret such
an admission as providing relevant prior art and therefore reject the appli-
cation.58 Moreover, even a patent applicant who would choose disclosure
in all possible cases will still be forced to make innumerable choices re-
garding potential disclosures. For example, a chemist who invents a new
chemical compound cannot possibly provide the PTO with each of the
hundreds of documents on chemistry that she read relating to the func-
tional properties of the new compound, even though all chemistry is inter-
related and therefore arguably relevant to the patentability decision. In-
deed, when applicants have tried to supply all possibly relevant documents
to the PTO, parties opposing the patent grant ("non-patentees") have
successfully accused them of hiding the most important art by burying it
within more trivial information.59 Hence, as long as a non-patentee can
prove the admissibility and relevance of prior art known to the patentee
that was not revealed during the original examiration, she has grounds
for a fraud or inequitable conduct defense.
B. Relaxation of the Patent Fraud Standard
Modern courts view the consequences of a successful patent fraud de-
fense as limited to the enforceability of the patent under review, and they
do not consider an allegation of patent fraud as a criminal proceeding
subject to the normal constitutional, statutory, and judicially-created safe-
guards. Without the influence of these factors, courts could ignore the con-
sequences of relaxing many of the requirements of common law fraud in
the patent context.60 This development has in many ways paralleled the
56. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.56 (1986) (original applications); id. § 1.555 (reexamination proceedings).
The PTO enacted the first regulation on the duty to disclose as Rule 56 in 1977. 42 Fed. Reg. 5593
(1977). A prior incarnation, entitled "Improper Applications," dates back at least to 1925. The duty
is separately applicable to PTO practitioners. 37 C.F.R. § 10.23 (1986).
57. The categories of prior art are set forth in 35 U.S.C. §§ 102-103 (1982 & Supp. I1 1985);
see also Hazeltine Research, Inc. v. Brenner, 382 U.S. 252 (1965) (exploring meaning of prior art
under § 103).
58. Cf Comment, supra note 8, at 161 (present patent fraud standards will induce cautious pat-
ent attorneys to disclose excessive information).
59. E.g., Rohm & Haas Co. v. Crystal Chem. Co., 722 F.2d 1556, 1564 & n.5, 1573 (Fed. Cir.
1983) (presentation of voluminous documentation in attempt to cure misrepresentation without precise
delineation of misrepresentations and curing documents insufficient), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 851
(1984).
60. "[C]onduct before the PTO which may render a patent unenforceable is broader than the
common law tort of fraud." Argus Chem. Corp. v. Fibre Glass-Evercoat Co., 759 F.2d 10, 14 (Fed.
Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 231 (1985); see also American Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons,
Inc., 725 F.2d 1350, 1363-64 (Fed. Cir.) (patent fraud and inequitable conduct requires materiality
and intent, not the six elements of common law fraud), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 821 (1984).
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development of mail fraud analysis.61 Courts hoped that holding appli-
cants liable for even small infractions would be fairer to non-patentees
(thereby enveloping the "unclean hands" doctrine)6 2 and would promote
candor and good faith disclosure before the PTO. 3
Presently, nondisclosures as well as misrepresentations may constitute
patent fraud or inequitable conduct." The test for the necessary level of
materiality has undergone a considerable evolution. Originally, an objec-
tive test required that a "reasonable examiner" would not have allowed
the claims but for the misrepresentation.65 A second test, considering the
responses of the actual examiner, was added to increase the number of
situations in which the PTO could label a nondisclosure material, and
then a third test required only that a reasonable examiner would be influ-
enced in his decision by the misrepresentation.66 Now a fourth test has
been added,6 7 which is satisfied if a reasonable examiner would merely
consider the misrepresentation important in her decision.6" Hence, many
previously non-material nondisclosures are now material.
The element of intent, which once required willfulness, can now be
satisfied by conduct that is reckless or grossly negligent, and such gross
negligence may be implied whenever a reasonable person would consider
the information material.6" In fact, materiality and intent are now bal-
anced by the courts, and a finding of a low level of one may be overcome
by a higher level of the other.70
The reliance requirement has been subsumed within the materiality
test. Moreover, the statement or omission may relate only to claims re-
61. See supra notes 30-42 and accompanying text.
62. See Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Automotive Maintenance Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806,
814-16 (1945).
63. See, e.g., American Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, Inc., 725 F.2d 1350, 1363 (Fed.
Cir.), cert. denied 469 U.S. 821 (1984).
64. J.P. Stevens & Co. v. Lex Tex Ltd., 747 F.2d 1553, 1559 (Fed. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 106
S. Ct. 73 (1985).
65. Norton v. Curtiss, 433 F.2d 779, 794-95 (C.C.P.A. 1970).
66. J.P. Stevens, 747 F.2d at 1559.
67. Id.
68. Id. The PTO promulgated the fourth test as a rule governing patent applicants, 37 C.F.R. §
1.56(a) (1986), but it has been uniformly adopted by the courts as a standard of equitable conduct, see
In re Jerabek, 789 F.2d 886, 890 n.10 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (affirming denial of reissue patent for viola-
tion of Rule 56), in part because the PTO said at the time of its promulgation that the rule merely
codified existing judicial precedent on the duty to disclose. 42 Fed. Reg. 5589-90 (1977); see also
KangaROOS U.S.A., Inc. v. Caldor, Inc., 778 F.2d 1571, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (irrelevant whether
examiner failed to make appropriate examinations which would have uncovered inequitable conduct).
69. "A permissible finding of gross negligence is sufficient [to prove the requisite intent] and can
be shown where appellant's attorney knew or should have known that the withheld reference would
be material to the PTO's consideration." Jerabek, 789 F.2d at 891 (citing Driscoll v. Cebalo, 731
F.2d 878, 885 (Fed. Cir. 1984)); see alsoJ.P. Stevens, 747 F.2d at 1560 (same rule applied as part of
defense of "fraud on the PTO").
70. The CAFC first set forth the balancing test in American Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa &
Sons, Inc., 725 F.2d 1350, 1364 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 821 (1984).
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jected by the PTO or abandoned before decision on the merits," in which
case there really has been no meaningful reliance at all. Injury is
presumed.
7 2
C. The Three Levels of Inequitable Conduct
Prior to the formation of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
(CAFC), most courts separated the types of "inequitable" activity into
three levels marked by the consequences imposed. However, the CAFC,
charged with judicial review of PTO decisions and the uniform applica-
tion of the patent laws,7 4 has taken the strongest stance against dishonesty
in the PTO by collapsing "fraud" into "inequitable conduct"'75 and ignor-
ing the effects of the various levels of egregiousness of conduct.7 6 Even so,
their separate study aids an analysis of the proper application of civil
RICO to patent fraud.
Inequitable conduct, which is the least egregious and has traditionally
resulted in unenforceability of the patent,77 is the charge when a patent
claim is tainted by misrepresentations or nondisclosures that are either not
vital to the claims or not made or omitted willfully.7 8 In theory, unen-
forceability is curable after corrective disclosures.7 9 The second level, the
71. Driscoll v. Cebalo, 731 F.2d 878, 885 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
72. "Where fraud is committed, injury to the public through a weakening of the Patent System is
manifest." Norton v. Curtiss, 433 F.2d 779, 796 (C.C.P.A. 1970). The court holds that injury is to be
inferred from a finding of fraud, even though the common law held that proof of fraud requires a
finding of injury! Yet the Norton ruling has never been questioned and is often not even discussed.
See, e.g.,J.P. Stevens, 747 F.2d at 1560.
73. SeeJ.P. Stevens, 747 F.2d at 1560 & n.7; see also E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Berkley
& Co., 620 F.2d 1247, 1273-74 (8th Cir. 1980) (discussing consequences of various types of conduct);
cf. Timely Prods. Corp. v. Arron, 523 F.2d 288, 297-98 (2d Cir. 1975) (recognizing distinctions but
arguing irrelevant in this case).
74. S. REP. No. 275, 97th Cong., Ist Sess. 5-6 (1981), reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEws 11, 15-16.
75. Argus Chem. Corp. v. Fibre Glass-Evercoat Co., 759 F.2d 10, 12 n.3 (Fed. Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 106 S. Ct. 231 (1985). However, even the CAFC occasionally recognizes that different levels of
materiality and intent may have different consequences. See, e.g., Litton Indus. Prods., Inc. v. Solid
State Sys. Corp., 755 F.2d 158, 166-67 & nn.18-19 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (suggesting in dicta that offen-
sive and defensive uses of inequitable conduct cannot be supported by equivalent levels of conduct).
76. See Thompson-Hayward Chem. Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 745 F.2d 27, 33 (Fed. Cir. 1984)
(doubting existence of useful difference between unenforceability and invalidity); American Hoist &
Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, Inc., 725 F.2d 1350, 1364 n.5 (Fed. Cir.) (leaving resolution of this
issue for another case), cert. denied 469 U.S. 821 (1984).
77. J.P. Stevens & Co. v. Lex Tex Ltd., 747 F.2d 1553, 1560-61 (Fed. Cir. 1984), cert. denied,
106 S. Ct. 73 (1985). But see supra note 76 (recent CAFC decisions suggest all inequitable conduct
sanctions equivalent).
78. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Berkley & Co., 620 F.2d 1247, 1274 (8th Cir. 1980)
(Markey, C.J. of the CCPA, sitting by designation); see also Kayton, Lynch & Stem, Fraud in
Patent Procurement: Genuine and Sham Charges, 43 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 30-47 (1974) (dis-
cussing elements of fraud and inequitable conduct defenses).
79. KangaROOS U.S.A., Inc. v. Caldor, Inc., 585 F. Supp. 1516, 1523 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (unen-
forceable patent may be cured-i.e., become enforceable-by cessation of misconduct or reissue), va-
cated and remanded on other grounds, 778 F.2d 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1985); accord Connell v. Sears,
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type traditionally denominated by "fraud," has required more materiality
and/or higher intent. The sanction for fraud is incurable invalidation of
the patent.80 Not all fraud is treated equally, however. Only misrepresen-
tations or omissions that are both willful and highly material invalidate
the patent and revoke the usual exemption granted a patent monopoly
holder against antitrust liability."
The Supreme Court in Walker Process Equipment, Inc. v. Food Ma-
chinery & Chemical Corp."2 limited antitrust liability to this last portion
of patent applicants because of several policies embedded in the patent
law. Though the Court recognized that the public interest in the integrity
of patent monopolies required redress for acts of willful and highly mate-
rial fraud,83 it also wanted to shield patentees from "innumerable vexa-
tious suits" that might deter vigorous pursuit of invention. 84 Justice
Harlan's concurrence also emphasized the careful balance protected by the
Court between encouraging invention and disclosure and discouraging
harmful monopolization.85 A broader ruling, he warned, "might well chill
Roebuck & Co., 722 F.2d 1542, 1550 n.1 (Fed. Cir. 1983); Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Allied Chem.
Corp., 477 F. Supp. 371, 394 n.86 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (reapplication not barred by unenforceable patent
under statutory scheme at that time), affd without opinion, 633 F.2d 208 (2d Cir. 1980).
However, the CAFC has now sharply questioned the existence of the possibility of cure. J.P. Ste-
vens, 747 F.2d at 1560. Even if cure is possible, in practice curing an unenforceable patent is an
almost insuperable obstacle. See generally Robin & Haas Co. v. Crystal Chem. Co., 722 F.2d 1556,
1571-72 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (discussing extensive corrective measures necessary to overcome prior mis-
conduct), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 851 (1984).
80. But see supra note 76 (recent CAFC decisions suggest all inequitable conduct sanctions
equivalent).
Determinations of unenforceability and invalidity affect the entire patent, not just the claim(s) in
suit.J.P. Stevens, 747 F.2d at 1561-62, and cases collected in 4 D. CHISUM, PATENTS § 19.0316], at
19-85 n.10 (1986); see also 35 U.S.C. § 288 (1982) (abrogating common law rule that invalidated
entire patent whenever one claim invalidated, except in case of fraud). These dire consequences may
explain why the standard of persuasion of patent fraud or inequitable conduct is the exacting "clear
and convincing evidence." Environmental Designs, Ltd. v. Union Oil Co. of Cal., 713 F.2d 693, 698
(Fed. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1043 (1984); see United States v. American Bell Tel. Co.,
167 U.S. 224, 241, 251 (1897).
81. Cataphote Corp. v. DeSoto Chem. Coatings, Inc., 450 F.2d 769, 772-73 (9th Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 408 U.S. 929 (1972); Papst Motoren GMbH & Co. v. Kanematsu-Goshu (U.S.A.) Inc., 629
F. Supp. 864, 870 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (quoting Erie Technological Prods., Inc. v. JFD Elecs. Compo-
nents Corp., 198 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 179, 185 (E.D.N.Y. 1978)); see also Walker Process Equip., Inc.
v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172 (1965) (establishing principle of potential antitrust
liability); id. at 179-80 (Harlan, J., concurring) (antitrust claims require "knowing and willful
fraud"); American Hoist, 725 F.2d at 1368 (for antitrust claim based on patent fraud, court "empha-
size[s] that a specific intent, greater than an intent evidenced by gross negligence or recklessness, is an
indispensable element"); E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Berkley & Co., 620 F.2d 1247, 1273 (8th
Cir. 1980) ("attempt to base ... antitrust counterclaim on 'inequitable conduct' has no basis in
law"); cf. 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1982) and 35 U.S.C. § 211 (1982) (sole supplier arrangements of goods,
"patented or unpatented," illegal). Of course, even after showing Walker Process fraud, an antitrust
plaintiff must still prove the market elements of a monopolization claim. Walker Process, 382 U.S. at
177-78.
82. 382 U.S. 172 (1965).
83. Id. at 176-77.
84. Id. at 176.
85. Id. at 179-80 (Harlan, J., concurring).
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the disclosure of inventions through the obtaining of a patent because of
fear of the vexations or punitive consequences of treble-damage suits."86
D. Potential Application of RICO to Patent Suits
Several practitioners have encouraged non-patentees to bring RICO
suits against patent holders.8 7 These commentators have not resolved the
important policy questions that underlie the expansion of RICO to patent
law;"8 rather, they argue from analogous cases 9 that RICO claims not
only are easy to add once inequitable conduct is alleged but also may
provide treble damages.90 The threat of substantial recovery would be a
powerful negotiating edge against a patent holder who may be contem-
plating her own treble damages suit against the non-patentee for
infringement."
A non-patentee can easily transform an inequitable conduct defense into
a RICO claim. Most communication with the PTO occurs via the mails
and the wires. 2 Each mailing, telephone call, or use of a means of elec-
tronic communication becomes a separate predicate act because it furthers
the alleged inequitable conduct. If the courts, like many commentators,
ignore the crucial and often subtle distinctions between criminal fraud and
inequitable conduct, any two such acts would thus suffice to ground a
RICO claim. In that case, the protection from vexatious lawsuits so care-
fully provided by Walker Process would be obliterated. Indeed, RICO
claims are much simpler to add to patent defenses than antitrust claims,
requiring few allegations beyond two mailings and gross negligence.
86. Id. at 180 (Harlan, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
87. See, e.g., J. FRICANO, GUIDE TO RICO 50 (BNA Corporate Practice Series 1986); Adamo &
Ducatman, supra note 20; see also Coolley, RICO: Modern Weaponry Against Software Pirates, 5
COMPUTER L.J. 143 (1984) (argument by analogy); Coolley, RICO: A New Weapon in Intellectual
Property Law, 66 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 138 (1984) (same). At least four patent RICO cases have been
instituted, but none has prompted a decision on the merits. Carpenter Technology Corp. v. Armco
Inc., No. 86 Civ. 608 (MJL) (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 1, 1986) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file) (RICO
counts dismissed due to prior settlement); see Adamo & Ducatman, supra note 20, at 188 n.8 (noting
three cases).
88. See infra notes 93-114 and accompanying text.
89. See, e.g., Adamo & Ducatman, supra note 20, at 187 & n.6. For examples of cases in related
fields, see Conan Properties, Inc. v. Mattel, Inc., 619 F. Supp. 1167 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (copyright);
Soltex Polymer Corp. v. Fortex Indus., 590 F. Supp. 1453 (E.D.N.Y. 1984) (trademark).
90. See supra text accompanying notes 14-15; see also Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 105 S. Ct.
3275, 3288 n.2 (1985) (Powell, J., dissenting) (noting lure to plaintiffs of treble damages recovery).
91. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (1982) authorizes recoveries for infringement of amounts not exceeding three
times the damages sustained.
92. See, e.g., PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, MANUAL OF PATENT
EXAMINING PROCEDURE §§ 713-713.10 (1983) (procedures for communications between PTO and
applicants); id. §§ 501-513 (receipt and handling of papers by mail and other means).
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III. INAPPROPRIATENESS OF RICO IN MOST PATENT FRAUD CASES
Civil RICO allegations should not be permitted in any but the most
extreme patent fraud cases, even though a superficial reading of the
RICO and mail fraud statutes might indicate the acceptability of a
broader use. 3 The policies that underlie the patent laws, unlike the poli-
cies behind the results in business fraud cases,94 are sufficiently weighty to
demand a re-evaluation of RICO's scope before RICO is extended to in-
clude traditional patent fraud. The weight of the patent laws derives from
the constitutional duty to "promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts,"95 and from the necessary incentives that patents create for inven-
tors.98 Close scrutiny of these policies demonstrates that in the absence of
willfulness and high materiality patent fraud does not give rise to RICO
liability.
93. The article by Adamo & Ducatman, supra note 20, is at present the only published work to
discuss in detail the application of civil RICO to inequitable conduct before the PTO. The authors
conclude with a plea that patent RICO claims "should not and must not become part of the same
boilerplate, knee-jerk charges of fraud and inequitable conduct that seem to find their way into every
answer filed in every patent infringement case." Id. at 247. Unfortunately, they could find no legal
barriers to RICO claims: "There appears to be no theoretical or policy justification grounded in the
patent laws for denying the addition of a RICO-based claim to the arsenal of recognized patent-
related defenses and offenses." Id. at 187. At most they argue that the very low levels of materiality
and intent that invalidated the patent application in Driscoll v. Cebalo, 731 F.2d 878 (Fed. Cir.
1984), "plainly should not be sufficient" to support a patent RICO claim because extension of mail
fraud and RICO to such conduct is "too attenuated." Adamo & Ducatman, supra note 20, at 230.
This plea for restraint and lack of argument is no longer enough. First, more recent opinions of the
CAFC make clear that the balancing test of American Hoist, not the more expansive rule of Driscoll,
is the primary tool for determining inequitable conduct. See, e.g. KangaROOS U.S.A., Inc. v. Caldor,
Inc., 778 F.2d 1571, 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1985). Hence Driscoll-type conduct, which still may prevent
patent issuance under Rule 56, should no longer support a mail fraud charge. Cf State Indus. v.
Rheem Mfg. Co., 769 F.2d 762 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (no inequitable conduct where nondisclosure not
material and patentee at most grossly negligent). Moreover, policy arguments provide a more complete
demonstration of the insufficiency of the Adamo & Ducatman conclusions. The same analysis that
formed the basis of the opinions in Walker Process requires that judges limit RICO claims to patent
fraud grevious enough to create potential antitrust liability.
94. Careful control of the entire patent system has been an objective of Congress since the found-
ing of the nation. See infra note 95 and accompanying text (discussing constitutional basis of patent
laws); see also Grant v. Raymond, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 218, 241 (1832) (Marshall, C.J.) ("[Ilt cannot be
doubted that the settled purpose of the United States has ever been, and continues to be, to confer on
the authors of useful inventions an exclusive right in their inventions ...."); Act of April 10, 1790,
ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109 (first patent act); Comment, supra note 8, at 159 ("The fundamental purpose of the
United States patent system is to stimulate the development of technology. ). Congress has
shown no corresponding concern for ordinary businessmen.
Moreover, because of the importance of the patent system, the Supreme Court has limited liability
in other areas of the law, such as antitrust, to the more egregious levels of patent fraud. See supra text
accompanying notes 83-86. By contrast, the Supreme Court has often extended the liability for "gar-
den variety" commercial fraud. E.g., TSC Indus. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438 (1976) (extending
liability under SEC Rule 14a-9); Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 105 S. Ct. 3275 (1985) (RICO).
95. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; see also Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 480
(1974) (positive effects of incentives in patent laws create new products and processes which benefit
all citizens).
96. See Comment, supra note 8, at 160 (discussing incentive effects of patent system on inventors).
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A. Limitations from Patent Law
As presently construed, both ordinary patent fraud and its extreme,
Walker Process fraud, fall within the broadly interpreted outlines of the
mail and wire fraud statutes and hence within RICO. However, the spe-
cial nature of the patent laws, recognized in Walker Process, should cau-
tion the courts against reflexive application of RICO in this context. Ar-
guments based on policy are especially helpful with a statute like RICO,
whose seemingly limitless breadth under literal interpretation has created
confusion in the courts9 7 and spurred many calls for reform.99 Moreover,
unlike ordinary business fraud cases, clear rules for liability based on pat-
ent fraud may be proposed that do not conflict with the policies behind
RICO.
If the courts do not curb the potential use of civil RICO in patent fraud
suits they will discourage invention and the disclosure of inventions in
patents, thereby inhibiting the progress of technological advancement.9
The balance between encouraging invention with its accompanying disclo-
sure and discouraging abusive market power has been, for the most part,
carefully protected by both the courts 00 and Congress, which, in the past
several years, has passed two different statutes,01 each designed to in-
crease the protection of patent grants.10 2 Given this special concern for the
integrity of the incentives in the patent system, courts should decline to
extend RICO to the patent application process, except where patent hold-
ers willfully violate their patent "contracts" and remove themselves from
the protection of the patent laws. Just as Walker Process 3 holds that
only willful and highly material fraud can strip patent holders of their
protection from antitrust liability, only similarly egregious fraud should
97. See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 120-23.
98. See, e.g., sources cited infra note 116.
99. See supra text accompanying notes 83-86.
100. See, e.g., Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172 (1965)
(protecting most patentees from vexatious antitrust suits); Handgards, Inc. v. Ethicon, Inc., 601 F.2d
986, 992-93 (9th Cir. 1979) (same), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1025 (1980).
101. Patent Law Amendments Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-622, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS (98 Stat.) 3383 (expanding protections available to inventors); Federal Courts Im-
provement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (creating CAFC).
102. See, e.g., 130 CONG. REc. H10,525, H10,527 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1984), reprinted in 1984
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5827, 5833-34; S. REP. No. 275, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 5-6
(1981), reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 11, 15-16.
103. Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172 (1965).
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create RICO liability. The majority"" of inequitable conduct cases would
thus fall outside the bounds of RICO.10 5
Courts should also impose a more stringent standard of persuasion"0 6
on patent RICO claims than on other RICO claims based on predicate
acts of mail fraud. Whereas ordinary civil RICO plaintiffs need only
demonstrate the predicate acts by a preponderance of the evidence,"0 ' the
standard of persuasion of inequitable conduct or fraud during the patent
application process is the more exacting "clear and convincing evi-
dence."' 0 8 The higher standard derives from the history of civil fraud
claims 09 and concerns about the drastic consequences'" of a finding of
patent fraud."' These consequences, along with the need to maintain the
proper balance of incentives under the patent system, also motivated the
Supreme Court's holding in Walker Process.11 2 Several courts have high-
lighted these considerations and have required that antitrust claims based
on fraudulent infringement actions be proven by clear and convincing evi-
dence, rather than by a preponderance of the evidence-the usual stan-
dard for civil antitrust suits. 13 Courts must retain this balance in the
104. An accurate count of the number of inequitable conduct, fraud, and Walker Process fraud
disputes would be difficult, if not impossible, to obtain, especially since most court opinions focus on
the problematic cases at the two extremes. Nonetheless, it seems fair to assume that the recommenda-
tions set out here will reduce the reach of RICO to a small fraction of all disputes where inequitable
conduct or fraud is alleged.
105. Cf. Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Automotive Maintenance Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806,
815 (1945) (actions that in equity may render patent unenforceable need not be criminal). No cases of
criminal patent fraud prosecutions are reported, though the government has occasionally brought civil
actions to cancel patents. See supra note 49.
106. For the differences between "burden of proof" and "standard of persuasion," see Note, Cau-
sation in Toxic Torts: Burdens of Proof, Standards of Persuasion, and Statistical Evidence, 96
YALE L.J. 376, 380-81 (1986).
107. United States v. Local 560 of Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 780 F.2d 267, 279 n.12 (3d Cir.
1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 2247 (1986). In adopting the preponderance standard in Local 560,
the Third Circuit was strongly swayed by Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 754 (1982) (setting
forth three-part balancing test for determining proper standard of persuasion), Herman & MacLean
v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 389-90 (1983) (rejecting, for securities law Rule 10b-5 cases, common
law standard of "clear and convincing evidence" traditionally used in fraud cases, in favor of prepon-
derance standard), and Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 105 S. Ct. 3275, 3282-83 (1985) (5-4 deci-
sion) (suggesting, without deciding, that preponderance standard may be sufficient in civil RICO
actions). Local 560, 780 F.2d at 279 n.12.
108. See supra note 80.
109. Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 388 & n.27 (1983); United States v.
American Bell Tel. Co., 167 U.S. 224, 240-42 (1897).
110. Potential consequences include rejection of a patent application, In re Jerabek, 789 F.2d 886
(Fed. Cir. 1986), loss of an interference proceeding, Driscoll v. Cebalo, 731 F.2d 878 (Fed. Cir.
1984), patent unenforceability, J.P. Stevens & Co. v. Lex Tex Ltd., 747 F.2d 1553 (Fed. Cir. 1984),
cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 73 (1985), and disciplinary action for patent counsel, Kingsland v. Dorsey,
338 U.S. 318 (1949) (per curiam); 37 C.F.R. §§ 10.20(b), 10.23(c)(2), (10), (11) (1986).
111. Norton v. Curtiss, 433 F.2d 779, 797 (C.C.P.A. 1970).
112. See supra text accompanying notes 83-86.
113. See, e.g., Loctite Corp. v. Ultraseal Ltd., 781 F.2d 861, 876-77 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (applying
Seventh Circuit law); Cataphote Corp. v. DeSoto Chem. Coatings, Inc., 450 F.2d 769, 772 (9th Cir.
1971), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 929 (1972).
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RICO context, and the clear and convincing evidence standard should re-
place the typical civil RICO standard in patent cases.""
B. Limitations from RICO
The special characteristics of a RICO action also place limits on patent
RICO claims. The dissenters in Sedima felt that the legislative history of
RICO requires that the statute be restricted to organized crime figures
and other "racketeers," as opposed to the "legitimate businesses" pres-
ently under attack.115 Adoption of the minority's position 1 6 would have
virtually eliminated patent RICO claims. A RICO claimant would have
had to prove that an organized crime member fraudulently obtained the
patent in furtherance of her criminal activities.
Even under the majority's expansive view of the statute, RICO provides
several methods for limiting civil patent RICO claims. For example, the
Court in Sedima suggested that the lower courts could narrow the defini-
tion of "pattern of racketeering activity. 11 17 This statutory definition is
peculiar to RICO because its use of "requires" instead of "means" seems
to mandate that the courts add constraints consonant with the rest of the
Act. 8 The Court noted that the legislative history supports the idea that
"pattern" implies that the predicate acts must be related to one another
and be part of a continuing scheme of activity.11
Since Sedima, the lower courts have sharply disagreed on the require-
114. Cf. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 755 (1982) (constitutionally permissible minimumn
standard of persuasion reflects weight of public and private interests affected, as well as societal judg-
ment about distribution of risk of error).
115. Sedima, 105 S. Ct. at 3288-89 (Powell, J., dissenting); id. at 3302 (Marshall, J., dissent-
ing); see also 1985 Hearings, supra note 27, at 272-73 (app. to statement of Ray J. Graves, Chair-
man, AICPA) (partial list of "legitimate" private civil RICO defendants); H.R. REP. No. 1549, 91st
Cong., 2d Sess. 187, reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 4007, 4083 (dissenting
views of Reps. Conyers, Mikva, and Ryan) (private action is "invitation for disgruntled and malicious
competitors to harass innocent businessmen").
116. The majority suggested that Congress "correct" RICO if unhappy with the course it has
taken. Sedima, 105 S. Ct. at 3287. Though Congress rarely reforms statutes at the Court's suggestion,
many voices have joined the Court. E.g., N.Y. Times, Oct. 15, 1985, at D2, col. 1. Several amend-
ments to RICO were introduced in the 99th Congress. H.R. 5445, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986)
(passed by House; no vote in Senate); H.R. 4892, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986); H.R. 3985, 99th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1985); H.R. 2943, 99th Cong., Ist Sess. (1985); H.R. 2517, 99th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1985); S. 1521, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985).
117. Sedima, 105 S. Ct. at 3285 n.14, 3287.
118. See supra note 18 (full text of § 1961(5)).
119. Sedima, 105 S. Ct. at 3285 n.14. The Court also suggested that another definition of "pat-
tern" contained in the same law, codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3575(e) (1982) and repealed by Pub. L. No.
98-473, tit. II, ch. II, § 212(a)(2), 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (98 Stat.) 1837, 1987
(1984) (effective Nov. 1, 1987), may be useful in interpreting RICO. 105 S. Ct. at 3285 n.14; ef-
Superior Oil Co. v. Fulmer, 785 F.2d 252, 257 & n.7 (8th Cir. 1986) (using, inter alia, § 3575(e) to
conclude that one fraudulent scheme, even where it may give rise to two predicate acts, does not evince
pattern); Foltz v. U.S. News & World Report, Inc., 108 F.R.D. 57, 60 (D.D.C. 1985) (using princi-
ples underlying § 3575(e) to focus on RICO pattern requirements).
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ments of the "pattern" definition. Some continue to hold that any two acts
of mail fraud arising out of a single scheme themselves constitute a pat-
tern.120 Other courts adopt a more complex approach to discerning a pat-
tern, emphasizing relatedness and continuity of the predicate acts, the
open-ended nature of the criminal conduct, and the similarity of the activ-
ity to organized crime. 2' The latter approach to the pattern requirement
is better reasoned because it more closely reflects the plain meaning of the
words of the statute as well as the legislative history.'22 When the explic-
itly announced elements of a definition do not fully establish all the char-
acteristics of a concept that the plain meaning of its terms imply, it is
proper to infer all other elements that complete the intended meaning of
the statute.'
23
Adding the implicit elements to the pattern requirement would signifi-
cantly reduce the number of patent RICO claims, barring most claims
found undesirable using the Walker Process analogy. 24 Most patent
fraud suits involve only one application process 2  and one fraudulent
scheme. The fraud lasts only until the application process ends. Hence,
although each misrepresentation or omission within a single examination
might give rise to a separate count of mail or wire fraud, even several
counts do not necessarily evince a "pattern." If a RICO allegation in-
volves several claims or several applications for related patents by the
same inventor or assigned to the same person, a finding of a pattern is
120. United States v. lanniello, 808 F.2d 184, 191-93 (2d Cir. 1986); R.A.G.S. Couture, Inc. v.
Hyatt, 774 F.2d 1350, 1355 (5th Cir. 1985); LSC Assocs. v. Lomas & Nettleton Fin. Corp., 629 F.
Supp. 979, 981-82 (E.D. Pa. 1986); see also Moran, The Meaning of Pattern in RICO, 62 CHI.-
KENT L. REv. 139 (1985) (suggesting that relatedness is part of "pattern" but that single scheme may
be enough).
This interpretation of pattern is exacerbated by the fact that each use of the mails in a single
fraudulent scheme is a separate violation of § 1341, so that there may be no correlation between the
number of predicate acts and the egregiousness of the conduct. See supra note 22.
121. Superior Oil Co. v. Fulmer, 785 F.2d 252, 256-57 (8th Cir. 1986) (citing with approval
various elements of RICO pattern); Richter v. Sudman, 634 F. Supp. 234, 238-40 (S.D.N.Y. 1986)
(focusing on continuity and relatedness); Northern Trust Bank/O'Hare v. Inryco, Inc., 615 F. Supp.
828, 831-33 (N.D. Ill. 1985) (requiring continuity, relatedness, and different criminal episodes sepa-
rated in time); see also Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n v. Touche Ross & Co., 782 F.2d 966,
971 (1lth Cir. 1986) (adopting suggestion of Sedima to use § 3575(e) to interpret "pattern").
The Seventh Circuit once asserted that any two acts of mail fraud created a pattern. United States
v. Weatherspoon, 581 F.2d 595, 601-02 (7th Cir. 1978); see supra note 44. However, the court
recently overruled Weatherspoon and chose the "middle course" among post-Sedima opinions, requir-
ing a case-by-case evaluation of continuity and relationship. Morgan v. Bank of Waukegan, 804 F.2d
970, 975 (7th Cir. 1986).
122. See supra note 10 and accompanying text (discussing original purpose of RICO).
123. Cf, e.g., Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976) (common meaning of words of
15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) as well as legislative history suggest that scienter must be implied as part of proper
claim under statute).
124. See supra text accompanying notes 99-105.
125. Continuation-in-part and divisional applications are part of the same application process, a
fact that Congress recognized when it gave such applications the same filing date as the original. 35
U.S.C. §§ 120-121 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
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more reasonable as well as more consistent with the original conception of
RICO as a weapon against large-scale, sophisticated, criminal
organizations.
Another possibility for restricting the use of RICO in patent cases fo-
cuses on the Act's definition of "person." The "person" who engages in
racketeering activity and violates section 1962(c).26 must be distinct from
the "enterprise" that receives the unfair economic advantage.1 27 This dis-
tinction is crucial in the patent context because most private-sector inven-
tors assign their patents to corporations,"28 and those corporations often
represent their assignees in the application process.' 29 Thus the corpora-
tions both commit and benefit from the predicate acts. It must be noted,
however, that this limitation on RICO pleading applies regardless of the
seriousness of the underlying patent fraud.
A final limitation derives from the nature of the relief available under
RICO. By itself, patent fraud requires no reliance and injury, because a
patent may be rendered unenforceable due to inequitable conduct con-
nected only to a claim in the application that did not become part of the
issued patent.'30 However, RICO's civil action provision requires that a
plaintiff be actually injured by the pattern of racketeering activity.' This
126. It is most likely that a patent fraud RICO claim would be brought under § 1962(c). The
broadest provision, § 1962(c) makes unlawful the conduct of an enterprise through a pattern of racke-
teering activity. Section 1962(a), on the other hand, requires proof that an enterprise was acquired or
maintained with funds derived from the pattern of racketeering activity. In order to obtain such proof,
a plaintiff would need to understand the flow of license fees and royalties from a fraudulently ob-
tained patent. Besides, the courts remain divided on the need for pattern/enterprise distinctions in §
1962(a) cases. See infra note 127. Section 1962(b) seems wholly inapplicable, see supra note 14, and
requires the same dichotomy as § 1962(c). See infra note 127.
127. Schofield v. First Commodity Corp. of Boston, 793 F.2d 28, 29-34 (1st Cir. 1986) ("person"
and "enterprise" cannot be identical under either direct or respondeat superior liability); Bennett v.
United States Trust Co., 770 F.2d 308, 315 (2d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 800 (1986); B.F.
Hirsch v. Enright Ref. Co., 751 F.2d 628, 633 (3d Cir. 1984); United States v. Computer Sciences
Corp., 689 F.2d 1181, 1190-91 (4th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1105 (1983); Bishop v. Corbitt
Marine Ways, Inc., 802 F.2d 122 (5th Cir. 1986) (per curiam); Haroco, Inc. v. American Nat'l Bank
& Trust Co., 747 F.2d 384, 399-402 (7th Cir. 1984), affd on other grounds per curiam, 105 S. Ct.
3291 (1985); Bennett v. Berg, 685 F.2d 1053, 1061 (8th Cir. 1982), afl'd en banc, 710 F.2d 1361,
cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1008 (1983); Rae v. Union Bank, 725 F.2d 478, 481 (9th Cir. 1984). Contra
United States v. Hartley, 678 F.2d 961, 988-89 (11th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1183 (1983).
See generally Adamo & Ducatman, supra note 20, at 246 nn.193-94.
By the same reasoning, the "person" and the "enterprise" must be distinct under § 1962(b). Bruss
Co. v. Allnet Communication Servs., Inc., 606 F. Supp. 401, 407 (N.D. Il1. 1985). However, the
courts sharply disagree whether they may be the same under § 1962(a). Compare Masi v. Ford City
Bank & Trust Co., 779 F.2d 397, 401-02 (7th Cir. 1985) (can be identical) and B.F. Hirsch, Inc. v.
Enright Ref. Co., 617 F. Supp. 49, 51-52 (D.N.J. 1985) (same) with Rush v. Oppenheimer & Co.,
628 F. Supp. 1188, 1197 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (must be distinct) and Willamette Say. & Loan v. Blake &
Neal Fin. Co., 577 F. Supp. 1415, 1427 (D. Or. 1984) (same).
128. Note, Incentives for People: The Forgotten Purpose of the Patent System, 16 HARV. J. ON
LEGIS, 129, 155 (1979). 35 U.S.C. § 261 (1982) authorizes the assignment of any application for
patent, patent, or interest in a patent.
129. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.32 (1986) (authorizing prosecution by assignee).
130, See supra notes 71-72 and accompanying text.
131. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1982).
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limits RICO actions to patents that issue with a fraudulently procured
claim. This restriction, like the person/enterprise requirement, is unre-
lated to the severity of the fraud. Moreover, injunctive relief, which some
thought at one time to be within a court's power in private civil RICO
actions,1 32 now seems to be unavailable. 133 The lack of this method of
relief in private RICO actions means that plaintiffs may not use civil
RICO alone to have patents declared unenforceable or invalid, although a
declaratory judgment count"3 can be added to the suit to obtain this relief.
IV. CONCLUSION
These substantial limitations will reduce the number of successful pat-
ent civil RICO claims, restoring the balance carefully maintained by the
existing system of patent laws. However, RICO plaintiffs actually injured
by the unfair economic advantage of a defendant's fraudulently procured
patents will still be able to recover in a manner consistent with the desires
of Congress and the spirit of the statute.
132. Bennett v. Berg, 685 F.2d 1053, 1064 (8th Cir. 1982) (dictum), affd en banc on other
grounds, 710 F.2d 1361, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1008 (1983); Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v.
Liebowitz, 570 F. Supp. 908, 910-11 (E.D.N.Y. 1983), aff'd on other grounds, 730 F.2d 905 (2d
Cir. 1984); see also Belgard, Private Civil RICO Plaintiffs Are Entitled to Equitable Relief Under §
1964(a), 2 RICO L. REP. 537 (1985). Contra Miller v. Affiliated Fin. Corp., 600 F. Supp. 987, 994
(N.D. I11. 1984).
133. Religious Technology Center v. Wollersheim, 796 F.2d 1076, 1081-84 (9th Cir. 1986).
134. 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1982 & Supp. III 1985); see also Kerotest Mfg. Co. v. C-O-Two Fire
Equip. Co., 342 U.S. 180 (1952) (limiting ability of non-patentee to bring declaratory judgment ac-
tion in forum other than one of existing infringement action).
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